Global Terrorism and Missionary Work: A Growing Challenge

Cheol-young Lee

Head of the International Affairs Research Association

New York, September 11, 2001 – The world watched in shock as the World Trade Center collapsed in a catastrophic terrorist attack, marking the dawn of the era of "global terrorism." In response, U.S. President George W. Bush launched military action in Afghanistan. More than two decades later, terrorism remains a persistent global threat, with attacks continuing in various regions. While the term "terrorism" has become part of everyday language, its precise definition remains unclear to many.

Understanding Terrorism

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288) in 2006 defines terrorism as:

"Criminal acts intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act, irrespective of the political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other motivations that may be claimed to justify them, can never be justified."

Schmid and Jongman (1988) analyzed 109 definitions of terrorism and identified three key elements: the use of violence(85%), political objectives(65%), and the generation of fear(51%). The consensus among scholars is that terrorism involves the use of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or international organizations. By this definition, figures such as Ahn Jung-geun would not be classified as terrorists, as he did not target civilians nor did he seek to instill fear to compel the Japanese government. In contrast, the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which targeted civilians and forced Japan into unconditional surrender, could theoretically fit the definition of terrorism. However, it is typically classified as a military act during wartime rather than an act of terrorism.

Trends in Global Terrorism

Despite perceptions that terrorist attacks have surged since 9/11, statistical data paints a different picture. 

Global Terrorism Incidents(1970–2021) (Source: Our World in Data - Terrorism)

Data indicates that terrorism peaked in the early 1990s rather than immediately after 9/11. A significant increase in attacks occurred following the Arab Spring in 2011, with a sharp spike in 2014 due to the rise of ISIS. Even before 2001, terrorism was already becoming a global phenomenon. Unlike localized terrorism, global terrorism involves transnational networks operating across borders. For instance, Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, was a Saudi national with Yemeni roots, while his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was an Egyptian physician. The perpetrators of 9/11 were recruited in Germany, trained in Afghanistan, and predominantly Saudi nationals. This intricate web of international connections defines global terrorism.

Unlike traditional terrorism, which is often confined to specific ethnic or nationalist struggles, global terrorism thrives on ideological and religious affiliations, transcending geographical boundaries. In recent decades, much of transnational terrorism has been anti-American, targeting the U.S. as a symbol of economic and cultural globalization. While the frequency of terrorist attacks did not dramatically increase after 9/11, the event marked a shift toward a more globally networked form of terrorism. Between 2001 and 2009, al-Qaeda and its affiliates expanded their reach, carrying out attacks in 15 countries across four continents (Goldman, 2011).

The Goals and Effectiveness of Terrorism

Experts generally agree that terrorism serves political objectives. While religious narratives often accompany terrorist acts, research suggests that political motives are the driving force behind most terrorist activities. A study by Abrahms (2012) found that only about 7% of terrorist groups successfully achieve their political goals. Terrorist objectives can be categorized into:

• Process goals: Securing funding, attracting media attention, disrupting peace processes, and recruiting members.

• Outcome goals: Achieving territorial autonomy, expelling foreign military forces, or establishing new political regimes.

Marsden (2012) further classified terrorism’s goals into four levels:

1. Tactical Goals: Effectiveness of individual attacks.

2. Organizational Goals: Sustaining operations through funding and recruitment.

3. Strategic Goals: Broader societal and economic impact, such as spreading fear.

4. Ultimate Goals: Long-term political and ideological aspirations.

Taking the 9/11 attacks as an example, this attack was the most devastating in history in terms of human casualties and economic costs, achieving complete tactical success. Organizationally, it achieved moderate success, as it positioned Al-Qaeda as the central force of the jihadist movement and one of the longest-standing terrorist organizations in history. However, from a national perspective, it ultimately failed because it did not succeed in forcing the United States to withdraw from the Middle East or in establishing a new Islamic state.

Among the four objectives proposed by Marsden, the tactical, organizational, and strategic goals align with what Abrahams refers to as "process goals," while the ultimate goal corresponds to an "outcome goal." Scholars generally assess that process goals are relatively easy to achieve, whereas ultimate goals are extremely difficult to accomplish.

However, under certain conditions, terrorism can also achieve political success. According to a study by Atkinson et al. (1987), in cases of terrorist hostage-taking incidents, 80% of hostages were released, and nearly half of those cases resulted in partial success in meeting political demands. Democracies, in particular, may be more vulnerable to this strategy, as they must balance the value of human rights protection with the reality of meeting terrorists' demands (Crenshaw, 2007). Hamas’s current hostage-taking strategy follows this logic, aiming to use negotiations with the Israeli government to fulfill its demands.

In fact, through the ceasefire agreement signed on January 15, 2025, 98 hostages are set to be released in exchange for Israel freeing approximately 2,000 convicted terrorists, among whom around 250 were sentenced to life imprisonment. Additionally, Israel has agreed to release about 1,000 terrorists who were arrested after October 7. Had Hamas not taken hostages, would such an outcome have been possible?

Even when the goal is not regime overthrow or extreme demands, terrorism can be used as a means to disrupt peace processes or create favorable conditions for the organization (Inbar, 1996). According to Kydd & Walter (2002), three-quarters of 14 peace agreements failed due to terrorism, demonstrating that terrorism can, to some extent, achieve political objectives.

Evolving Terrorist Strategies

Terrorists continuously adapt their tactics to maximize their impact. Kydd & Walter (2006) identify five key strategies used by terrorist groups:

1. Attrition: Inflicting sustained damage to force governments into policy changes.

2. Intimidation: Demonstrating the government’s inability to protect its citizens.

3. Provocation: Provoking excessive retaliation to gain public sympathy.

4. Spoiling: Disrupting peace efforts by fostering distrust.

5. Outbidding: Competing with rival groups for dominance.

The effectiveness of terrorism remains a debated issue. However, one thing is certain: terrorism is constantly evolving and remains a global security threat.

Terrorism and Its Impact on Missionary Work

As terrorism reshapes global security, its impact on missionary work has become increasingly evident. Terrorist groups seek to create fear to influence governments and deter organizations from operating in high-risk regions. While religious motivations are often overstated, terrorism indirectly affects Christian missionary efforts.

A notable case is the 2007 kidnapping of South Korean missionaries in Afghanistan. While the attack was not purely religiously motivated, it underscored the dangers of missionary work in volatile regions. Such incidents have heightened security concerns, leading to a decline in Christian missions in the Middle East and Arab world.

If extremist groups aim to discourage missionary efforts, terrorism serves as an effective tool to send a clear message: "Christian missions in Islamic territories are dangerous." This strategy has influenced governments and churches, leading to reduced missionary deployments. As C.S. Lewis's The Screwtape Letters suggests, forces opposing Christianity work strategically to hinder the spread of the gospel.

Despite security concerns, the global church must remain steadfast in its mission. While caution and safety measures are essential, fear should not dictate missionary efforts. With prayerful preparation and strategic planning, the message of Christ can continue to spread, even in the face of global terrorism.

Reference

Abrahms, M. (2012). The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited. Comparative Political Studies. 45(3): 366-393.

Atkinson, S.E., Sandler T. and Tschirhart, J. (1987). Terrorism in a bargaining framework. Journal of Law and Economics, 30(1): 1-21.

Crenshaw, M. (2007). “Terrorism and global security”. In Leashing the dogs of war: Conflict management in a divided world. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Goldman, O. (2011). The Globalization of Terror Attacks. Terrorism and Political Violence 23(1): 31-56.

Herre B, Samborska, V., Ritchie H. & Roser, M. Terrorism. Our World in Data. https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism.

Inbar, E. (1996). Islamic extremism and the peace process. Terrorism and Political Violence, 8(2): 199-215.

Kydd, A. and Walter, B. F. (2002). Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence. International Organization, 56(2): 263-296.

Kydd, A. and Walter, B. F. (2006). The strategies of terrorism. International Security, 31(1): 49-80.

Marsden, S. (2012). Successful terrorism: framework and review. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression, 4(2): 134-150.

Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. (1988). “Political Terrorism”. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing.