Islamic Extremism: A Case Study of Pakistan

Stephen Jang(Head of the South Asian Studies Association), Cheol-young Lee(Head of the International Affairs Research Association), Jin-young Kim(Editorial Board)

Introduction

According to the Arab Youth Survey, which has been conducted annually since 2008 among young people aged 18 to 24 in the Arab region, it is evident that perceptions of Islam among the youth in Arab societies are changing.

(Source: ASDA’A BCW Arab Youth Survey, 2019, p. 14)

In the 2019 survey, 66% of Arab youth stated that religion has an excessively strong influence on society, a figure that has steadily increased since 2015. This indicates a growing negative perception among young people in the Arab world— the very region where Islam originated and played a central role— regarding the influence of religion in society.

 (Source: ASDA’A BCW Arab Youth Survey, 2019, p. 15)

These statistics reflect a fundamental transformation occurring within Arab societies. Local missionaries working in Arab countries have also observed and experienced this shift firsthand. They witness a growing trend of secularization, where economic and cultural influences are gradually outweighing religious values. However, a different pattern is emerging in non-Arab Muslim societies.

In Iran, Islam continues to exert immense influence as the ideological foundation of the Islamic Republic. Meanwhile, Turkey, which traditionally had strong secularist tendencies, has recently seen a resurgence of Islamic identity due to political and social developments. Additionally, in South Asia, particularly in the Indian subcontinent—Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India—the rise of Islamic extremism goes beyond fundamentalism, manifesting in more radical forms.

This study aims to analyze the background of this phenomenon, focusing on the case of Pakistan. To achieve this, field interviews were conducted with missionaries working in Pakistan. The findings suggest that the roots of Islamic extremism in South Asia can be traced back to the historical and cultural indigenization of Islam in the region.

To support this argument, this study will examine two major Islamic revivalist movements: Jama’at-e-Islami and Tablighi Jama’at. Furthermore, it will explore the sectarian conflicts within Pakistan, analyzing their connections to the rise of Islamic extremism. The discussion will particularly focus on the Barelvi and Deobandi traditions, examining their roles in shaping Pakistan’s radical Islamic landscape.

Islamic Revivalist Movements in Pakistan

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) was founded in 1941 by Abul Ala Maududi as an Islamic revivalist movement aimed at political, social, and religious reform. Maududi strongly criticized nationalism and secularism, advocating for the establishment of a pure Islamic state. His strategic approach focused on the Islamization of the educated elite, with the long-term goal of transforming society as a whole—an approach that shares similarities with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Initially, Jamaat-e-Islami avoided direct political participation, but later shifted its strategy toward electoral politics, aiming to establish an Islamic state through the existing political system. This transition marked its development into a major Islamic revivalist movement that sought not only religious reform but also political and social transformation (Ali & Amin, 2020).

In contrast, Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) was established in 1927 in British India with the goal of preserving and strengthening Muslim identity under colonial rule. Unlike Jamaat-e-Islami, Tablighi Jamaat avoids political involvement and focuses on personal faith renewal and missionary efforts to bring about social change. Over time, it expanded beyond India and Pakistan, growing into a transnational Islamic revivalist movement with an estimated 70 to 80 million members worldwide (Vahed, 2003). This movement is characterized by voluntary participation and inclusivity across various socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds. In summary, while Jamaat-e-Islami seeks political and social transformation, Tablighi Jamaat remains a non-political movement centered on individual faith and spiritual growth.

Despite their differences, these two movements share several historical origins.

1. Resistance Against British Colonialism and Western Neocolonialism

European colonial rulers introduced Western languages and education systems, creating a new Muslim elite class that was influenced by European values and governance structures. While this elite class was partially shielded from Western cultural influences, it ultimately lost autonomy and sovereignty, leading to the exploitation and oppression of the broader Muslim population (Hunter, 1988). Both Jamaat-e-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat emerged as responses to imperialism and the corruption of Muslim ruling elites, reflecting widespread grievances among ordinary Muslims. As a result, Jamaat-e-Islami adopted political objectives, such as the establishment of an Islamic republic, while Tablighi Jamaat sought to counter secularism by reinforcing Islamic values through personal faith and missionary activities. According to Zacharias (2015), Tablighi Jamaat’s early mission also included an implicit political aim—to strengthen Muslim political influence during the colonial period.

2. Response to Hinduism and Religious Rivalry

Maududi believed that Muslims must return to pure Islam to safeguard their political interests and that compromise with Hinduism was impossible. He fiercely opposed nationalism and secular politics, asserting that only an Islamic state could resolve the challenges faced by Muslim society (Rowman & Littlefield, 2014). Metcalf (1996) explains that Tablighi Jamaat emerged as a direct response to the Arya Samaj movement, a Hindu revivalist movement supported by the British that sought to reconvert Hindus who had embraced Islam during earlier Muslim rule. In reaction, Tablighi Jamaat intensified its missionary efforts to strengthen Muslim religious consciousness and revive Islamic practices.

Unlike the Arab world, which maintained its Islamic identity under Ottoman rule, India’s Muslim population faced both British colonial domination and religious competition from Hinduism. This historical context played a crucial role in shaping Pakistan’s trajectory, contributing to its evolution into a strong Islamic republic after its separation from India.

Barelvi-Deobandi Sectarian Divide

The sectarian breakdown of Pakistan's Muslim population is not clearly documented, but it is estimated that the Barelvi sect constitutes more than 50% of the population, making it the largest sect. The remainder is divided with Deobandi at 25%, Shia at 15-20%, and Ahl-e-Hadith at 5% (Schrott, 2014).

Both Barelvi and Deobandi belong to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, but their ideological divide originated during the British colonial period in the Indian subcontinent. The Deobandi school sought to restore the purity of Islam by rejecting local cultural elements they deemed to be deviations from Islamic values. In particular, the Deobandis strongly criticized the practices of pilgrimages to shrines and the piri-muridi system (the relationship between a saint and his follower), which were widespread in local communities, as they were seen to conflict with Islamic purity (Suleman, 2018). In response to this, Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi, a Sufi Islamic scholar, founded the Barelvi school, emphasizing the reverence for Prophet Muhammad and Muslim saints, and eventually labeling Deobandi scholars as heretics (Sanyal, 2005). The central doctrine of Barelvi was the Blasphemy Law, which became a significant cause of ideological clashes between the two sects.

Despite the continuous conflict, the Barelvi sect has managed to become the dominant sect in Pakistan due to significant political factors. In 2004, under General Musharraf’s government, the state actively promoted Sufi Islam as a response to extremism, with many political leaders and bureaucrats presenting Sufism as the true essence of Islam. Musharraf's government officially supported Sufism, granting authority to Pirs (Sufi saints) and Barelvi clerics to promote social stability. In contrast, interpretations of Islam by Deobandi and Wahhabi groups were seen as distorted, foreign, and socially destructive. Musharraf established a policy of "enlightened moderation" and sought to spread the message of peace embedded in Sufism, rejecting violent extremism (Washington Post, 2004). In fact, studies by Curtis & Mullick (2009) and Rabasa et al. (2007) suggested that Sufism could be a major alternative to combat extremism.

However, the official state support for Barelvi and Sufism as a countermeasure to extremism led to a radical shift, deviating from its originally moderate stance. The central issue was the Blasphemy Law. The radicalization of the Barelvi sect became evident in the 2011 Punjab Governor Salman Taseer incident (Sajjad, 2024). Taseer had defended Asia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death under the blasphemy law, and criticized the harshness of Section 295-C of Pakistan's Penal Code. In response, Barelvi clerics condemned Taseer, and he was eventually assassinated by his own bodyguard Mumtaz Qadri in 2011 (Dawn, 2011). After this, several Barelvi organizations intensified their political activities against the reform of the blasphemy law, spreading extremism, and since 2016, there has been a surge in violence committed in the name of blasphemy (Suleman, 2018). 

Mumtaz Qadri's execution and the funeral procession of his coffin being paraded through the city by a Barelvi crowd(Source: https://www.dawn.com/news/1242863)

Due to its geopolitical and historical characteristics, Pakistan has long been a focal point of terrorism. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Pakistan is ranked as the second most affected country by terrorism in the world. During the War on Terror, the Barelvi movement was recognized as a peaceful Sufi tradition and viewed as a countermeasure to extremism. However, their core doctrine, the Blasphemy Law, has had the opposite effect, amplifying Islamic extremism. Philippon (2014) points out that the extremism within the Barelvi sect is not a recent, spontaneous phenomenon but rather has a violent history. He highlights that while Barelvi leaders present themselves with a Sufi identity, they are deeply involved in the political and social realities of Pakistan.

Missionary Direction in Pakistan

Pakistani nationalism has historically embraced radical Islam as a central part of its identity within various historical and sociocultural contexts. In Pakistan, where the Barelvi sect is dominant, the blasphemy law plays a crucial role and significantly impacts other Islamic sects with differing beliefs. This law poses a major obstacle to evangelism, as local Christians who share the Gospel with Muslims are sometimes accused of blasphemy or even fall victim to violence before being imprisoned. Muslims in Pakistan, influenced by the Barelvi sect, often show a strong emotional attachment to their religious beliefs and tend to prefer emotional, relational approaches over logical or rational debates. Therefore, to effectively evangelize in Pakistan, a relational approach based on individual trust is needed, rather than simply relying on one-sided proclamation or logical argumentation. However, this strategy must not limit the work of the Holy Spirit or neglect the inherent power of the Gospel.

There are local Christian churches in Pakistan, with an estimated 5 million Christians around 2% of the population as of 2023, among a total population of approximately 240 million. This number may include Muslim-background converts who practice their faith in secret, so the actual number could be higher (Korea Research Institute for Mission, 2023). Pakistani Christians have endured persecution and discrimination as a minority in an Islamic state and have a deep understanding of the sociocultural and religious context of Pakistani society. For this reason, partnering with local churches in ministry is seen as an effective and necessary strategy.

In recent years, Pakistan has been affected by the global economic crisis. With soaring exchange rates, inflation, and economic turmoil, Pakistan’s economy is facing serious instability (Kim Kyung-hoon, Nam Yoo-jin, 2022). This economic hardship has hit the lower-income population particularly hard, as prices have tripled while incomes have remained the same, worsening their financial struggles. As a result, the younger generation has shifted its focus from spiritual concerns to immediate livelihood issues. Moreover, Pakistan’s political instability continues, with ongoing protests and political infighting that do little to address the real problems faced by ordinary people.

In this environment, the people of Pakistan are increasingly seeking external help due to a sense of hopelessness in solving their problems. This situation presents an opportunity for evangelism. To comfort the broken hearts of Pakistani Muslims and share the message of eternal peace and life, it is necessary to take a strategic and wise approach, offering love and support through practical assistance, education, and other means.

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