U.S. Foreign Policy under Trump’s Second Term: Responding to a New International Order

Sangmin Lee (Editorial Advisory Board Member)

I. Introduction

The world has been jolted by U.S. foreign policy since President Donald Trump was re-inaugurated this past January. The United States—the post-WWII superpower that built and guarded the “liberal international order”—is now openly criticizing and dismantling it. The Trump 2.0 administration argues that while the liberal international order—symbolized by free trade, multilateralism, and democracy—once served U.S. interests, it no longer does, and therefore a new international order must be established. Under the banner of “America First,” it is prioritizing the maximization of U.S. national interest and pushing through foreign policies that run counter to the principles of the liberal international order. This article examines what that order is, why the Trump 2.0 administration seeks to dismantle it, and what foreign policies the administration is pursuing in the process.

II. The Liberal International Order

1. Concept

The liberal international order refers to an international order grounded in “liberalism.” Alongside realism, liberalism is a leading IR theory that views the international system as anarchic (lacking a central authority) yet still conducive to inter-state cooperation. It does not treat states as the only important actors in international relations; it highlights non-state actors such as international organizations and multinational corporations, and holds that international organizations and regimes enable cooperation among states. Through free trade and advances in science and technology, interdependence increases, wealth and prosperity expand, democracy spreads, and peace becomes possible (Park, 2016).

Realism, by contrast, sees the international system as anarchic, assumes states pursue power and security and therefore conflict and competition, and argues that states fail to cooperate even when they share common interests. It treats the state as the most important actor and does not grant independent status to non-state actors. States are rational actors that calculate costs and benefits to maximize their interests (Park, 2016).

2. Characteristics

Key features of the liberal international order grounded in liberalism include the following (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.):

1) Emphasis on multilateralism

It aims at multilateral cooperation to address international problems. States are seen as capable of solving global issues through international organizations and regimes such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, and NATO.

2) Rule-based order

It holds that order and stability arise when states honor rules, treaties, agreements, international law, and customary norms and act within a legal framework, rather than relying on sheer power.

3) Free trade and growing economic interdependence

By lowering tariffs and liberalizing trade, the global market expands, interdependence deepens, and cooperation is expected to prevail over war.

4) Spread of democracy

Democracy is viewed as the ideal form of government; the likelihood of war among democracies is lower, so the spread of democracy and the protection of human rights are emphasized (democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1983)[1]).

5) U.S. leadership as a “benign hegemon”

Exercising overwhelming military, economic, and diplomatic power, the United States punishes states that undermine the liberal order and unilaterally supplies “public goods” in security and economics to states that seek to uphold it—acting as a benign hegemon (Kindleberger, 1973).

3. Historical Background

The liberal international order was constructed by the United States at the dawn of the Cold War to counter the Soviet Union, targeting what Dean Acheson called “a free half”—Western Europe, Japan, and others (Acheson, 1969; Allison, 2018).

1) The Bretton Woods system

After WWII, the U.S. launched the Bretton Woods international monetary system, laying the order’s economic foundation. Agreed in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, the system made the U.S. dollar the key currency for trade and finance and established a fixed-exchange-rate regime pegging other currencies to the dollar. This stabilized postwar finance and promoted trade expansion. It also created the IMF and IBRD to fund reconstruction. Western Europe, Japan, Korea, and others borrowed to rebuild infrastructure such as power plants, roads, and ports, rapidly restoring their industrial base. In 1947, the U.S. concluded the GATT, which underpinned tariff cuts and the dismantling of trade barriers to promote free trade; GATT later evolved into the WTO.

2) NATO and the United Nations

The U.S. launched NATO and supported the UN, spreading norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law and establishing the political (indeed political-military) foundations of the order. In 1949 Washington created NATO as a collective security arrangement to contain the USSR, and it concluded bilateral alliances with Japan (1951), Australia (1951), and Korea (1953). Earlier, in 1945, the U.S. led in founding the UN and, together with the IMF, IBRD, and GATT, designed a multilateral, rule-based order. The 1948 Marshall Plan provided about $13 billion (roughly $100 billion in today’s dollars) to 16 European countries to rebuild Western democracy. During the Cold War’s ideological confrontation (“democracy vs. communism”), Washington sought to diffuse human rights, the rule of law, and democracy as international norms. It launched Voice of America (1942) and Radio Free Europe (1949) to beam information into the USSR and Eastern Europe. In 1961 it created USAID to provide aid to developing countries as a counterweight to Soviet influence.

3) Globalization of the liberal order

With the Soviet collapse in 1991, many judged that the U.S.-led liberal order had triumphed over Soviet communism (Fukuyama, 1992)[2], ushering in the “globalization” of that order. The WTO was launched in 1995, FTAs proliferated, tariffs fell, non-tariff barriers came down, and world trade surged. Global supply chains[3] formed, with advanced economies consuming and developing countries manufacturing; multinationals invested worldwide and offshored production to low-wage countries; China emerged as the “world’s factory.” The U.S. also attempted to spread democracy by force (Allison, 2018): President Clinton bombed Yugoslavia in 1999 to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; President George W. Bush launched the Iraq War in 2003 under the Bush Doctrine[4], which held that democratizing the Middle East would bring peace; and in 2011 President Obama struck Qaddafi’s regime as it violently suppressed the Arab Spring protests in Libya.

4. Challenges

From the late 2000s, analyses held that the liberal order was in decline due to the rise of “revisionist powers” that refused to conform and sought to revise it; failures and reversals in the spread of democracy; the rise of illiberalism; resurgent nationalism; and American public fatigue with overseas engagements (Liblett, 2017).

1) Rise of revisionist powers (Mearsheimer, 2001)

The U.S. government has labeled China and Russia as “revisionist powers” (White House, 2017). Many in Washington also count Iran and North Korea among them, seeing the four as an “axis of revisionist powers” (Mead, 2025). Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 in violation of another state’s territorial sovereignty and launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. China pursues its “Belt and Road” strategy, militarizes the South China Sea, and pressures Taiwan to alter regional order (Mead, 2014). Iran and North Korea undermine the nonproliferation regime by developing nuclear weapons and have supported Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

2) Democratic diffusion stalled and reversed

U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011) failed to entrench democracy. The Arab Spring (2011) led to unrest and civil wars in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, followed by reversion to authoritarianism. The U.S. and Europe expected that integrating China and Russia into the international economic system (e.g., the WTO) would gradually democratize them: economic interdependence would yield peace, an expanding middle class in open markets would demand democracy, and participation in international institutions would socialize them into norms as “responsible stakeholders” (Zoellick, 2005). China (2001) and Russia (2012) joined the WTO, but the outcome diverged from expectations: President Putin deepened authoritarianism after returning to power in 2012, and President Xi consolidated power from 2012 and abolished term limits in 2018.

Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2024 reported that political rights and civil liberties declined globally for the 19th consecutive year. Democratic backsliding has been observed in countries including Hungary, Poland, Türkiye, India, the Philippines, Brazil, Tunisia, and Ethiopia (Freedom House, 2024). Backsliding involves the gradual erosion of democratic institutions—elections persist, but the rule of law, media freedom, civil society, and separation of powers deteriorate (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). This trend is described as “illiberalism.”

3) Rise of illiberalism

In Hungary, since 2010 Prime Minister Orbán has strengthened a long-term hold on power through constitutional and electoral changes, weakened judicial independence, and pressured media and civil society[6]. In Poland, the ruling PiS party infringed on judicial independence and constrained media under the banner of “judicial reform.” In Türkiye, President Erdoğan has curtailed media and judicial independence since 2003 and concentrated power via a 2017 constitutional shift to a presidential system. Tunisia—once a post-Arab Spring democratic success—has seen President Saied dissolve parliament and centralize power since 2021.

Populism, often accompanying illiberalism, frames society as a struggle between a pure people and corrupt elites (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Populist leaders claim to embody the “true will of the people” and dismiss institutional constraints (courts, media, legislatures). President Trump is often cited as a prototypical populist leader who persistently attacks democratic institutions (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Illiberalism and populism erode institutions and norms, posing challenges to the liberal international order.

4) Resurgent nationalism

The UK left the EU in 2016 (Brexit)[7], largely to “take back control”—to restore sovereignty by making decisions independently of Brussels (KDI Economic Education Center, 2022). This challenged the EU, a model of supranational governance under the liberal order, and showcased nationalism (the nation-state) as a barrier to that order (Mearsheimer, 2017). The 2015 influx of Syrian refugees into Europe saw EU burden-sharing proposals rejected by Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, while far-right nationalist parties surged in states like Germany, France, and Italy. President Xi champions the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and President Putin justifies annexing Crimea and the war in Ukraine as protecting the Russian nation. President Trump’s “America First” is likewise assessed as “illiberal nationalism” (Kim, 2021).

5) American fatigue

Fatigue with the U.S. acting as “global policeman” became pronounced after the 2008 financial crisis (Pew Research Center, 2013). Domestic recovery took priority over overseas involvements, and skepticism grew over the costs of order maintenance (military interventions, foreign aid). War-weariness deepened with Iraq and Afghanistan: while Saddam Hussein was deposed, building a liberal democratic Iraq failed; and the 20-year Afghan war ended in 2021 with a Taliban return, prompting many Americans to question the loss of thousands of U.S. service members and trillions of dollars—and to oppose further stewardship of the liberal order (In Nam-sik, 2025).

III. President Trump and the Liberal International Order

1. Critique of the order

Against this backdrop, Donald Trump—an outsider to America’s political establishment—was elected president in 2016 on the slogan “Make America Great Again (MAGA),” and again last year. In both terms, his foreign-policy lodestar has been “America First.” He argues that the liberal international order the U.S. has built and upheld for 80 years harms U.S. interests and should be dismantled; American power and deal-making should be used to maximize U.S. gains (Brands, 2025).

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also serves as National Security Advisor, encapsulated this view during his January confirmation hearing. He called the post-Cold War liberal international order a “dangerous delusion” that has become a “weapon aimed at America” (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2025). He cited obsessive devotion to free trade that hollowed out the middle class, weakened America’s industrial base, and offshored supply chains to competitors; uncontrolled migration that exacerbated immigration and refugee crises; and the exploitation of the order by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The Chinese Communist Party, he argued, joined the WTO and reaped benefits without meeting obligations, “lying, hacking, and stealing” its way to superpower status at America’s expense. Iran and North Korea foment disorder through nuclear programs and terrorism while evading accountability via UN Security Council vetoes. In this chaos, he said, the free world must be refounded—and only a strong, confident America can do it—by pursuing an interest-first foreign policy that makes the U.S. safer, stronger, and more prosperous.

Liberal IR scholars (e.g., Joseph Nye, John Ikenberry) counter that President Trump is the true revisionist—doing more to destroy the liberal order than China or Russia (Keohane & Nye, 2025; Chosun Ilbo, 2025a). Realist scholars (e.g., John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt) argue that Trump is a consequence, not the cause, of the structural challenges outlined above.

2. U.S. foreign policy in Trump’s second term

The hallmark of Trump’s second-term foreign policy is to move, item by item, against the liberal order of free trade, multilateralism, and democracy.

1) Protectionism via tariffs

Viewing the free-trade regime as unfair, the administration wields tariffs to protect U.S. industry (manufacturing) and jobs. On April 2 it declared “Liberation Day,” imposing a 10% baseline tariff on nearly all countries. It added “reciprocity tariffs,” differentiated by bilateral imbalances and market barriers, ranging from 11% to 50% (average 15%) (Chosun Ilbo, 2025b). Beyond economics, tariffs serve as diplomatic leverage—pressuring the EU, Japan, Korea, and others to concede on security, investment, or burden-sharing[8].

2) Weakening multilateralism

Arguing that multilateral bodies constrain U.S. sovereignty and harm its interests, the administration has withdrawn from them. On inauguration day, President Trump signed an order to leave the WHO. He then withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement, declined to rejoin the UN Human Rights Council, and sanctioned the ICC for seeking to prosecute senior Israeli officials even though Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute. The administration prefers bilateralism over multilateralism in handling international issues.

3) De-prioritizing democracy and human rights

President Trump is highly reluctant to foreground democratic values in foreign policy (Kim, 2021). He sees past U.S. efforts—such as promoting Middle East democratization—as squandering energy on changing other regimes rather than serving U.S. interests. The administration dismantled USAID, the main agency for development assistance to the Global South. It effectively shuttered VOA, RFA, and RFE—key instruments for information outreach to promote democracy in Eastern Europe and Asia. It allocated no FY2026 budget for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The State Department’s annual human rights report—traditionally released each year for 198 countries—was delayed by six months and finally published on August 12; it was more than halved in length compared with the previous year, and criticism of North Korea’s political system was substantially reduced (King, 2025).

4) Selective engagement in international crises

President Trump is not an isolationist; his thinking aligns more with “offshore balancing” (Choi, 2024; Kim, 2021). Offshore balancing counsels against acting as a global police force and instead engaging selectively in key theaters—Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East—encouraging regional powers to maintain balance themselves and intervening only when necessary. It avoids value-driven interventions (democracy promotion, regime change) to reduce costs (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016). At the June NATO summit he secured a pledge for members to raise defense spending up to 5% of GDP and pressed Korea and Japan to increase host-nation support. On Ukraine, he said no U.S. troops would be deployed and that Europe—not the U.S.—should be at the center of Kyiv’s security (AP News, 2025). By shifting responsibility to allies and regional powers, he acts as an offshore balancer (Mearsheimer, 2001). The June U.S. airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities sought to constrain Iran’s program via precision strikes rather than occupation and long-term intervention, to prevent Iran’s rise as a regional hegemon, and to channel post-strike diplomacy back to the EU3—an offshore-balancing approach. Striking Iran, a revisionist power, also pressures China, Russia, and North Korea.

Meanwhile, as in his first term—when he brokered the Abraham Accords normalizing relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan—President Trump in his second term has actively mediated peace: e.g., between the DRC and Rwanda, India and Pakistan, Cambodia and Thailand (border clashes), and Armenia and Azerbaijan.

IV. Theoretical Underpinnings of Trump’s Foreign Policy

Trump’s second-term foreign policy is grounded in realism: it privileges power and national interest, downplays international organizations, regimes, and norms, employs coercive tariff power to pursue protectionism, and deemphasizes democracy and human rights. Given the rise of revisionist powers (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) seeking to revise the status quo, and given U.S. selective engagement as an offshore balancer in key theaters (Europe, Northeast Asia, Middle East), it can be seen as rooted in offensive neorealism[9] (Kang, 2019).

Unlike defensive neorealism—which assumes status-quo states seeking balance—offensive neorealism argues that anarchy prevents states from trusting others’ intentions; to ensure survival against potential aggression, states aggressively maximize power and seek hegemony. Once a state becomes a regional hegemon, it acts as an offshore balancer to prevent the rise of peer hegemons in other regions (Walt, 2011).

V. Trump’s Middle East Policy in the Second Term

Trump’s Middle East policy is characterized by active engagement (Mead, 2025)—not the neoconservative approach of long-term deployments for democratization (as under George W. Bush), but an offensive-neorealist strategy: leveraging regional powers to prevent rival hegemons while shaping key outcomes in line with U.S. interests. The regional powers most aligned with Trump today appear to be Israel, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia (The Washington Post, 2025). In May, on his first overseas trip of the term, he visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, securing deals worth hundreds of billions of dollars. In Saudi Arabia he met Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, for the first time, promising sanctions relief and urging normalization with Israel. Since April the administration has held five rounds of nuclear talks with Iran, and in June launched surprise strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. President Trump has also proposed large-scale relocation of Gaza residents, continued to press for an end to the Israel–Hamas war, and advocated for Gaza’s reconstruction.

VI. Conclusion

U.S. foreign policy in Trump’s second term can be summarized as dismantling the “liberal international order” that Washington built and defended for the 80 years following the Cold War. As a result, the United States—once a “benign hegemon” that provided global public goods as the “world’s policeman”—now appears to transact coercively with friend and foe alike to prioritize U.S. interests, leveraging its immense economic and military power. Some predict that, as with President Biden’s partial restoration of the liberal order after Trump’s first term, the U.S. will revert again once Trump leaves office. However, “America First” appears to be a response to structural changes and challenges buffeting the liberal order. For that reason, America’s new strategy for a new international order—epitomized by Trump’s second-term foreign policy—may well persist beyond Trump.

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[1] With the end of the Cold War and the democratization of many Eastern European states, democratic peace theory drew intense interest and provided a rationale for U.S. efforts to expand democracy and market economies worldwide.[2] “The end of history” in the sense that, with liberal democracy’s victory over Marxism-Leninism, no rival ideology remained to challenge it.[3] A global supply chain is a cross-border production network: one country supplies raw materials, another processes components, a third does final assembly, and products are exported to consumer markets—both a symbol of globalization and a core structure of today’s international economy.[4] President Bush drew on Natan Sharansky’s The Case for Democracy to articulate the Bush Doctrine: democracies favor diplomacy over war, so worldwide democratization is essential for a peaceful and stable order—an idea consonant with neoconservatism.[5] The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013, is a strategy to link Asia, Europe, and Africa through infrastructure, trade, finance, and cultural cooperation.[6] Orbán has argued that Western-style liberal democracy is in decline and that Hungary should build a new model—an “illiberal state.”[7] “Brexit” is a portmanteau of Britain + exit, referring to the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union.[8] Korea–U.S. understanding of July 30, 2025: Korea lowers the reciprocal tariff rate from 25% to 15% in exchange for $350 billion in investment in the U.S. and $100 billion in U.S. energy purchases.[9] Whereas classical realism grounds conflict in human nature, neorealism explains it through the structure of the anarchic international system.