Modern Arab Islamist Theology and a Turning Point: Focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood

Jin Hyunji (Middle East Arab Research Association)

1. Introduction

In the modern Arab world, Islamism is generally defined as “a modern political ideology and movement that seeks to construct a state and society consistent with Sharia by making Islamic beliefs and norms the central principles of political, legal, and social order” (Shepard, 1987; Tibi, 2007). Based on this definition, modern Islamism can be categorized into several types according to two axes—whether it uses violence and whether it participates in institutional politics—such as participatory Islamism, non-political traditionalist currents, radical revolutionary Islamism, and Salafi jihadism (Shepard, 1987; Wilson Center, 2025).

Founded in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has come to represent a leading model of participatory Islamism within this spectrum (Pew Research Center, 2010). The Muslim Brotherhood possesses the typical characteristics of Islamism in that it understands Islam as a “comprehensive way of life” and rejects the separation of religion, politics, and society. At the same time, however, it is clearly distinguished from Salafi jihadism or armed revolutionary movements because it has focused more on institutional participation—through elections, parliaments, and professional associations—and on building social foundations through welfare, education, and charitable activities rather than violent revolution (Clark, 2014; Schmidt-Feuerheerd, 2023).

As a model of participatory Islamism, the Muslim Brotherhood was for a long time regarded as the most influential modern Islamist organization in the world. However, following the Egyptian military coup in 2013, its institutional base in domestic politics was rapidly weakened. Furthermore, in 2026, when the United States designated certain branches as SDGTs, it faced an unprecedented level of isolation within the international financial and political ecosystem, leading to a severe crisis (Schanzer & Wahba, 2026; Homeland Security Today, 2026).

This article aims to examine: (1) how the Muslim Brotherhood’s model of participatory Islamism came to function as an alternative to the state in Arab societies, and (2) how the 2013 Egyptian coup and the United States’ 2026 SDGT designation have reduced both the domestic base and the international ecosystem of this model.

2. Participatory Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood: Growth as a “State Alternative” in Arab Society

1) Comprehensive Islam: Hasan al-Banna’s Ideology and Vision of Institutional Participation

(SOURCE = Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood | News | Al Jazeera)

In Majmuʿat al-Rasaʾil (Collection of Epistles)—a compilation of sermons and letters—Hasan al-Banna described Islam not as a religion limited to belief and worship but as a comprehensive system (Nizam Shamil) encompassing the state and homeland, government, morality and strength, mercy and justice, culture and law, economy and property, diplomacy and the military (al-Banna, n.d.; Wendell, 1978). For al-Banna, Islam was a holistic worldview that went beyond personal faith to encompass political, legal, social, and economic order, and the modern distinction between religion and politics was unacceptable. He also regarded the Qur’an and the Sunnah as the “foundation of a complete order,” repeatedly emphasizing that Islam is a comprehensive worldview that regulates all areas of life, including social norms, government, legislation, and educational systems (Bano, 2013; Woroniecka-Krzyzanska, 2011).

At the same time, al-Banna preferred gradual reform and institutional participation rather than violent revolution. Emphasizing a step-by-step reform (Islah) that moves from the individual to the family, society, and the state, he proposed a staged strategy combining missionary work (dawah), education, organization, social welfare, and participation in elections and parliaments (Bano, 2021; Clark, 2014). While adhering to the Salafi reformist tradition of returning to the Qur’an, Sunnah, and the model of the early Muslim community, al-Banna also attempted to adopt modern tools such as parliaments, political parties, newspapers, and modern educational institutions (Bano, 2013). The combination of this understanding of comprehensive Islam and a gradualist strategy later formed the basic model of participatory Islamism encompassing welfare, education, and political party activities.

2) Hakimiyya and Jahiliyya: Sayyid Qutb’s Radical Political Theology and Its Tension

Sayyid Qutb, one of the most influential thinkers within the Muslim Brotherhood, added a radical political theology to the organizational foundation established by al-Banna (Khatab, 2002). A key concept in his thought, hakimiyya, refers to the principle that “sovereignty belongs entirely to God alone, and legislative authority cannot belong to anyone other than God” (Qutb, n.d.-a; Qutb, n.d.-b). Qutb directly linked this principle to tawhid (the oneness of God), viewing any system that follows human laws and authorities rather than God’s as taghut, that is, illegitimate idolatrous power (Khatab, 2002).

In his book Maʿalim fi al-tariq (Milestones), Qutb stated, “Islam knows only two kinds of societies: the Islamic society and the Jahili society” (Khatab, 2006, p. 85). He understood jahiliyya not merely as a particular historical period before Islam but as a social condition that can exist in the present. Even if a society formally acknowledges Islam, if its laws, education, politics, and customs are governed by non-Islamic principles and secular ideologies, he considered it part of a Jahili society. In this understanding, jahiliyya refers to “any condition in which God is not recognized as the supreme legislative and governing authority.” This diagnosis provides a theological basis for challenging existing systems and presenting the construction of a new society and state based on Sharia as a religious duty (Khatab, 2006; Cheema, 2008).

Qutb’s political theology introduced potential radicalization and tension within the Muslim Brotherhood, which officially advocated institutional participation through elections and parliaments (Khatab, 2002; Khatab, 2006). Jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda reinterpreted Qutb’s concepts, defining modern states as systems of jahiliyya and taghut and using them as theoretical justification for armed struggle (Jamestown Foundation, 2016). In contrast, the mainstream leadership of the Brotherhood attempted to absorb some aspects of Qutb’s radicalism while maintaining a path of non-violence and institutional participation combining elections, parliamentary politics, and social welfare activities (Brown & Hamzawy, 2013).

3) The Politics of Welfare and Education: Formation of a “Parallel Society” and Mass Base

The ideas of al-Banna and Qutb were embodied in the Brotherhood’s practices in social welfare and education (Bano, 2021; Clark, 2014). The Brotherhood established and operated extensive networks of mosques, schools, medical clinics, charitable organizations, and vocational training centers. Through these institutions, it built and mobilized networks of members and supporters by replacing or supplementing educational, health, and social security services that the state failed to provide sufficiently (Clark, 2014). Such welfare and education networks are often described as a “state without a state” (Clark, 2014, p. 1). Al-Arian and others analyze that the Brotherhood’s welfare institutions came to be perceived as service providers competing directly with the state in areas traditionally considered the state’s domain. As a result, the Brotherhood emerged as a de facto alternative power to the Egyptian state and regime (Al-Arian, 2018; Clark, 2014).

3. The 2013 Egyptian Coup: Domestic Collapse of the Institutional Participation Strategy

1) Multiple Conflicts with the Military, Bureaucracy, and Social Forces After Coming to Power

In the 2011–2012 Egyptian parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) secured about 43–47% of the seats, becoming the largest single party. In the 2012 presidential runoff election, candidate Mohamed Morsi won the presidency with 51.7% of the vote. This was considered an important turning point, as it marked the first time the Brotherhood—long a social movement and opposition organization—converted the social base it had accumulated through welfare, educational, and religious networks into institutional political power and reached the center of state governance.

However, as an organization with almost no experience in actually running state institutions suddenly found itself responsible simultaneously for the government, presidency, and parliament, limitations in policy and administrative capacity quickly became apparent. The Morsi government structurally clashed with the judiciary and military when it significantly expanded presidential powers during the November 2012 constitutional declaration and the constitution-drafting process. At the same time, relations with secular and liberal groups, Coptic Christians, and parts of the urban middle class deteriorated rapidly during reforms perceived as favoring Islamism (Brown, 2013). Combined with fuel and electricity shortages, security instability, and economic stagnation, repeated large-scale anti-government protests emerged (JPIA, 2014). As a result, although the Morsi government succeeded in coming to power through elections, it has been evaluated as a political Islamist government that failed to secure democratic and inclusive governance or broad social support (Brown, 2013).

2) The Coup and the Ban on the Brotherhood: The Failure of Political Islam

On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military carried out a military coup that removed President Morsi and suspended the constitution, citing massive anti-government protests led by the Tamarod movement and a political deadlock. After Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced a roadmap in a televised speech, the military detained the president, shut down Islamist-leaning television channels, and arrested Brotherhood leaders and key activists. Subsequently, the Egyptian government and courts designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, dissolved the Freedom and Justice Party, and froze or confiscated the assets of Brotherhood-linked associations, non-profit organizations, and welfare institutions. Many leaders were put on mass trials for charges such as violations of national security and incitement to violence, receiving long prison sentences or death penalties. The Brotherhood’s public organizational structure and legal basis for activity effectively collapsed. As a result, most analyses conclude that the organization was forced to withdraw from open and legal activity and reorganize underground around remaining forces and small overseas exile networks (Brooke, 2019, pp. 185–210).

The short-lived rule and rapid collapse of the Egyptian Brotherhood government have been evaluated as revealing the limitations of participatory Islamism. Critics argue that gaining power through elections did not lead to democratic and inclusive governance but instead triggered social division and military intervention (Brown, 2013). However, other studies emphasize that this failure should not be attributed solely to internal factors within the Brotherhood but must also be understood in relation to structural factors such as resistance from existing power elites—the military, judiciary, and bureaucracy (Momani, 2014)—as well as accumulated economic and social crises and constraints in the international environment (JPIA, 2014). From this perspective, the 2013 coup can be seen less as the end of political Islam in general than as exposing the specific limitations and vulnerabilities faced by the Brotherhood-style strategy of institutional participation within Arab authoritarian systems (al-Anani, 2012–2013).

3) Changes in Perceptions of the Failure of Political Islam in Arab Society, Especially Among Youth

According to repeated surveys since the mid-2010s, including Arab Barometer and the Arab Youth Survey, many Arab young people have shown sharply declining trust not only in political Islam but also in political parties, governments, and religious institutions in general. The proportion of respondents who say they trust political parties remains in the single digits to around 10 percent, and trust in Islamist movements has also clearly declined compared to the early 2010s. In Egypt in particular, trust in the Muslim Brotherhood fell from 44% in 2011 to 17% in 2018; in Jordan it dropped from 35% to 14%; and in Morocco from 45% to 25% (Arab Barometer, 2019). At the same time, responses indicating that “religion plays too large a role in the Middle East” increased noticeably after 2015. In the 2019 survey, about two-thirds of youth answered that “the influence of religion is excessive,” a rise of 16 percentage points from 50% in 2015 (ASDA'A BCW, 2019). This suggests that the failure of political Islam does not necessarily mean the collapse of Islamic faith itself but rather indicates skepticism and attempts to readjust the relationship between religion and politics.

However, at the same time, the perception has strengthened among some young people and activists that participatory Islamism—such as that represented by the Muslim Brotherhood—was thwarted through collusion between the military, Western powers, and domestic elites. As a result, some analyses warn that a small but dangerous trend is emerging in places such as Syria, Iraq, and the Sinai, in which certain individuals lose hope in institutional politics and peaceful reform and instead regard armed struggle as the only alternative.

Therefore, after the failure of Muslim Brotherhood–style political Islam, Arab societies appear to be searching for a new balance within a polarized landscape in which two tendencies coexist: a majority seeking to readjust the relationship between religion and politics, and a minority moving toward more extreme forms of radicalization.

4. The 2026 U.S. SDGT Designation: Isolation Under International Sanctions

1) Targets and Legal-Political Meaning of the SDGT Designation

On January 13, 2026, the U.S. Department of State and the Treasury Department announced that, for the first time, they had incorporated the Muslim Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon into the terrorism sanctions framework (Homeland Security Today, 2026). The Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood (al-Jamaa al-Islamiyah) was designated both as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), while the Egyptian and Jordanian branches were designated solely as SDGTs. The FTO system has been applied to more than 70 organizations since its introduction in 1997, and the SDGT system (E.O. 13224) has been applied to more than 1,000 individuals and entities since 2001, functioning as a key instrument of international counter-terrorism sanctions (U.S. Treasury/OFAC, 2026). The U.S. government stated that the basis for this designation was that these branches assisted Hamas with financing, organizational support, and the recruitment of fighters, describing the move as the “first step in ongoing efforts” targeting threats associated with the Brotherhood under President Trump’s 2025 executive order (Schanzer & Wahba, 2026). This decision has been interpreted as symbolizing a hardline policy shift by the United States: by incorporating some Brotherhood branches—previously treated as Islamist political movements—into the same global terrorism sanctions system as al-Qaeda and ISIS, the U.S. is treating their alleged terrorist connections themselves as the target of sanctions (Schanzer & Wahba, 2026).

An SDGT designation constitutes a strong financial and legal sanction targeting the funding flows and organizational operations upon which Brotherhood branches depend. Once listed by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), any assets or property interests of the designated individuals or entities within the United States or under U.S. jurisdiction are automatically frozen, and all transactions between them and U.S. persons or financial institutions are prohibited. In addition, third-country financial institutions that conduct transactions with SDGT-designated entities risk becoming targets of U.S. sanctions themselves, which usually leads international banks to sever relations with them. In this sense, the SDGT designation of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese branches is likely to exert pressure that weakens the entire financial and operational ecosystem through which the Brotherhood network has been maintained via overseas donations, charitable organizations, companies, and informal financial networks.

2) Difference from Domestic Repression in the Arab World: From Internal Suppression to External Blockade

Since the 2013 coup, Arab states including Egypt have designated the Brotherhood as a “terrorist organization” and suppressed it through domestic security and criminal measures such as arrests and trials of leaders, death sentences, closure of offices, freezing of assets, and harsh crackdowns on protests (Awad, 2019). However, these measures often remained internal repression within each country, and the Brotherhood was able to maintain some room for activity through overseas branches, exile networks, and international charitable organizations (al-Anani, 2023).

In contrast, the United States’ 2026 SDGT designation can be understood as an attempt to block Brotherhood branches and their affiliated networks from outside national borders by using the sanctions authority of the United States, which controls the world’s largest settlement currency and financial hub. Therefore, it opens a new phase that significantly narrows the international support upon which the model of participatory Islamism relied.

However, scholars and policy analysts also warn that while SDGT and FTO designations pressure the financial and organizational ecosystem of Brotherhood branches, they may simultaneously reinforce among supporters of political Islam and sympathetic groups the perception that the Western or Christian world is criminalizing Islamism as a whole, potentially increasing feelings of victimization and the risk of radicalization. In this sense, the United States’ hardline sanctions not only reduce the Brotherhood’s ecosystem but may also contain the possibility of encouraging some individuals or groups to move in more violent and closed directions.

5. Conclusion: Confusion After Political Islam and the Response of the Global Church

The trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood encapsulates the possibilities and limitations that modern Arab Islamism has experienced. The “comprehensive Islam” envisioned by al-Banna presented a model of participatory Islamism, and the Brotherhood once rose to the point of functioning as a “state alternative” that substituted for the welfare and representative functions of the state. However, the 2013 Egyptian coup revealed that this model failed to resolve structural tensions with existing power elites—such as the military, judiciary, and bureaucracy—and did not sufficiently secure governing capacity or social trust. With the 2026 U.S. SDGT designation incorporating some Brotherhood branches into the global terrorism sanctions system, the movement now faces unprecedented pressure and isolation not only domestically but also within international financial and diplomatic networks. In this context, the political project of comprehensively restructuring the state and society through “comprehensive Islam” appears, at least in the Brotherhood-style model, to have reached serious limits.

However, the crisis of political Islam does not mean the end of Islam itself. Public opinion surveys and field research indicate that many Arab young people are experiencing deep distrust and confusion toward political parties, the state, and religious institutions alike, caught between the failure of political Islam and the return of authoritarianism. At the same time, polarization is occurring: on the one hand, there are demands to readjust the public role of religion; on the other hand, there is movement toward more radical politicization of religion.

In this context, the global church should not triumphantly consume the retreat of political Islam or identify itself with particular regimes or political camps. Rather, it should stand as a community of service that accompanies the many who have been wounded by violence, failed revolutions, and economic crises. It should present a model of non-violent and humble faith between Islamism and secularism, listen to and comfort the anger and questions produced by the failure of political Islam, and move toward sharing the gospel not as another political project but as a testimony to the presence of God who is with people in their suffering.

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