The Russia–Ukraine War and the Erosion of International Norms

Cheol-young Lee

Head of the International Affairs Research Association

International norms refer to shared expectations or standards of behavior among international actors—primarily states—regarding what they should or should not do (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Typical examples include the prohibition of civilian massacres and the guarantee of diplomatic immunity. Unlike formal international laws such as treaties or agreements, international norms are informal and customary. Their effectiveness stems not from legal sanctions but from social pressures such as international condemnation and diplomatic isolation. In simple terms, just as "cutting in line" may not be illegal but can still be met with social disapproval, violations of norms can provoke public censure and thereby influence individual behavior. These norms operate not only within specific societies but may expand into universally shared expectations across the international community. International norms can thus be understood as the global extension of such social norms.

Among the new international norms that emerged after World War II, the most crucial is the prohibition against territorial conquest by force. This principle was enshrined in the UN Charter to avoid repeating the history of Nazi Germany’s annexations of other countries through military aggression. Although not all states have consistently adhered to this principle, it was largely observed until relatively recently. For example, when Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982, it was swiftly expelled by British forces and a UN Security Council resolution. Similarly, Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was met with a U.S.-led and UN-authorized coalition that restored Kuwait’s sovereignty. However, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, external actors failed to enforce this norm fully. Although many countries protested, Russia’s incorporation of Crimea was ultimately accepted as a fait accompli. The increasingly fractured global response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 clearly demonstrates the weakening influence of this core norm (Fazal, 2025).

In this context, the response of the United States is particularly noteworthy. In the anarchic structure of international relations—where no higher authority exists above sovereign states—the U.S. has long positioned itself as the "world’s police." It has often taken the lead in responding to violations of international norms, including issues of territorial integrity and human rights. However, today’s U.S. appears different from its past. Former President Trump was notably less committed than President Biden to Ukraine’s survival, even suggesting that Ukraine should cede part of its territory to Russia to end the war. Trump revealed an intention to restructure the international order through transactional means rather than coercion, as seen in his proposals to purchase Greenland, renegotiate rights to the Panama Canal, occupy and develop the Gaza Strip, and even annex Canada. Nevertheless, he has not ruled out the use of force. The recent refusal of the U.S. to explicitly label Russia as an aggressor in G7 statements or UN votes signals that the U.S. is undermining the very international norms it once defended.

Source = Ukraine’s Geopolitical Precarity – Spectre Journal

Should Ukraine cede its territory and the war conclude, this would not simply mark the end of a single war—it could signify a de facto regression of international norms. It would set a precedent for other states involved in territorial disputes. Indeed, Azerbaijan occupied Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 with almost no response from the international community. There is speculation that Sudan may occupy Ethiopia’s Amhara region, and Venezuela is already claiming vast territories in Guyana, with the potential risk of military action. More troubling still is the likelihood of escalated border disputes between nuclear-armed states like China, India, and Pakistan. In fact, India and Pakistan experienced a military standoff in May 2025.

China, after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 and U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan that August, began openly signaling its intention to invade Taiwan. Following Pelosi’s visit, China launched missiles toward Taiwan for the first time in 27 years, raising the level of threat to a “new normal,” which suggests further military escalation is likely. The U.S. Department of Defense warns that China may be prepared for a Taiwan invasion by 2027. China possesses twelve times the number of troops and six to ten times the amount of military equipment compared to Taiwan. It is estimated that it would take about two weeks for U.S. forces to land in Taiwan, during which China aims to finish the war. Hence, how quickly U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea respond could be a critical factor shaping the outcome of such a conflict (Choi Wuseon, 2021). Furthermore, if Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory is accepted, it would likely accelerate China’s invasion of Taiwan, putting South Korea at risk of being drawn into the vortex of war.

Meanwhile, the Israel–Hamas war, which began in 2023, is also entering a new phase. Former President Trump proposed that the U.S. occupy and develop the Gaza Strip and even argued for the permanent relocation of the 2.3 million Palestinian residents to countries like Jordan and Egypt. Such a proposal constitutes forced displacement, which is prohibited under international law, and has been strongly condemned by the UN and international human rights organizations. Yet the reality remains clear: just like international norms, international law also has limited enforcement power. In the current climate where territorial norms are collapsing, Israel’s settlement expansion is likely to accelerate, potentially leading to de facto changes in Palestinian territorial ownership. Thus, the outcome of the Russia–Ukraine war is not merely a regional conflict, but could become a critical turning point that determines the future direction of 21st-century international order and the normative foundations underlying it. If Ukraine ends the war by surrendering its territory to Russia, it will establish a dangerous precedent suggesting that territorial conquest through force is once again legitimate.

For decades, the international community has sustained a relatively stable global environment under the norm that “conquest is illegal,” providing historical conditions that allowed missionaries around the world to spread the gospel freely. But now that foundation is being shaken. Many mission fields where we serve are still plagued by ethnic conflicts and border disputes, which are not merely political tensions but potential precursors to community collapse, religious persecution, large-scale displacement, and war crimes. As a result, countless missionaries may be forced to leave their mission fields, and the door for the gospel may narrow within the framework of international order. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of God remains unshakable, and the gospel continues to advance. Even now, the name of the Lord is being proclaimed among the nations, and no geopolitical upheaval can halt God's redemptive work. Therefore, we have a responsibility to boldly carry out the mission of evangelism while we still have the time. As the Lord said, “Night is coming, when no one can work” (John 9:4). This is not merely a warning but a call to awaken us to the fact that now is the “day” in which we can still proclaim the gospel. Now is the time to pray, stay awake, and fully devote ourselves to the mission of the gospel and peace.

Reference

Finnemore M. and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4): 887-917.

Fazal, M.T. (2025). Conquest Is Back: A Peace Deal in Ukraine Could Further Normalize What Was Once Taboo. Foreign Affairs.

Choi, W. (2021). Taiwan military conflict scenarios and South Korea’s response (KINU Policy Report 2021-51). Korea Institute for National Unification.